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The Auckland Engineering Lifelines Project (A.E.L.P.) was initiated by the Auckland Regional Council, New Zealand,
in 1996 to reduce the damage to and downtime of utilities such as water, wastewater, gas, power, etc., resulting
from a variety of natural and technological hazards. A key initial project was a volcanic risk assessment. This paper
describes the methodology that was developed to specifically assess the volcanic risk to lifelines from the Auckland
Volcanic Field and distal volcanic centres in the central North Island, the application of the risk assessment and
further developments beyond the initial project.
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The Auckland Engineering Lifelines Project (A.E.L.P.) was
initiated by the Auckland Regional Council, New Zealand,
in 1996 and involved some 40 organisations comprising
local government, utility service providers, and other inter-
est groups. The aim of the A.E.L.P. was to reduce the dam-
age to and downtime of utilities such as water, wastewater,
gas, power, etc., resulting from a variety of natural and
technological hazards. The project assessed the vulnerabil-
ity of utilities, identified interdependencies and developed
practical strategies for reducing risk, and for response and
reinstatement following a hazard event. The design of the
project was initially based on and followed from two other
successful Engineering Lifelines Projects in New Zealand;
the Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Study (Hopkins et al.
1993) and the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Study
(Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1997).
The A.E.L.P. adopted an “all hazards approach” and in
the hazard identification stage of the project discussion
documents were prepared for a number of hazards includ-
ing earthquake, tsunami, cyclone, drought, fire, hazardous
substances spills, biohazards, vandalism, and volcanic erup-
tions from the Auckland Volcanic Field as well as from the
more distal volcanoes in the central North Island (Daly
and Wilkie, 1997). For the final study, these hazards were
reduced to earthquake, volcano, tsunami and cyclone. A
key outcome of the project, and an important deliverable,* Correspondence: m.daly@gns.cri.nz
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origwas to enable participating organisations to identify the
extent of their interdependence on other lifeline services.
The identification of interdependencies not only allows the
individual organisations to better prepare themselves for
disaster, but also enables them to influence and prioritise
the response of other organisations to them immediately
after a disaster event.
At the time of the establishment of the A.E.L.P., there
was only rudimentary information available about the
Auckland Volcanic Field. The Ministry of Civil Defence
had produced the Volcanic Hazard Information Series,
translating available scientific knowledge into a publicly
accessible form (Smith & Allen, 1993). The hazard ana-
lyses produced for the A.E.L.P. (Daly and Wilkie, 1997)
were based on this information, as well as a few specific-
ally commissioned studies for earthquake hazards (lique-
faction, ground shaking, landslides), ex-tropical cyclone
and tsunami. In the case of volcanic hazards, work was
commissioned by the Auckland Regional Council to
bring together the available information and extend this
into hazard and risk commentaries that could then be
adapted for use in the A.E.L.P. (Johnston et al. 1997a, b).
This early work prompted local authorities to start to
take the possibility of another eruption from the Auckland
Volcanic Field more seriously and a long term commit-
ment to expanding a monitoring network established
by the University of Auckland was made. No systematic
risk assessment had been undertaken up to this point.his is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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oped to specifically assess the volcanic risk from the
Auckland Volcanic Field and distal centres in the central
North Island for use in the A.E.L.P. This methodology is
important in a historical context because since 2000 a
number of initiatives have been established to improve
Auckland’s understanding and management of its volcanic
risk e.g. the Auckland Lifelines Group (ALG), the Volcanic
Impacts Study Group (VISG), the Auckland Volcanic Sci-
ence Advisory Group (AVSAG), the Auckland Volcanic
Contingency Plan and the multi-organisational research
programme DEVORA (Determining Volcanic Risk in
Auckland). The early risk assessment methodology devel-
oped for the A.E.L.P. set the groundwork for these subse-
quent efforts. A similar methodology used to assess the
earthquake risk for Auckland for use in the A.E.L.P project
has been previously described in Wilkie and Daly, (1998).Volcanic hazards in Auckland
The city of Auckland is built on a basaltic volcanic field
(Figure 1) which may have been active as recent as 1400 A.
D. (Sandri et al. 2012). The Auckland Volcanic Field covers
360 km2 and contains 50 identified vents. Twenty eruptions
have occurred over the past 20 000 years with Rangitoto the
largest and youngest having formed about 600 years ago.
Eruptive styles from the Auckland Volcanic Field range from
episodes of Strombolian and/or Hawaiian fire fountaining
commonly accompanied by phreatomagmatic episodes with
a Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) between 0 and 2.
Principle hazards include tephra falls, lava flows, ballistics,
and pyroclastic density currents (Sandri et al. 2012).
However, the Auckland Region faces an additional vol-
canic threat from several large central North Island vol-
canic centres (Figure 2) that are located 140–280 km to
the south and south-east. In the central North Island there
are two major volcano types: (i) andesitic cones and (ii)
rhyolitic calderas (Wilson et al. 1995). Activity at cone vol-
canoes (i.e. Mt Taranaki; and Tongariro, Ngauruhoe, and
Ruapehu (the last three collectively comprising the Tonga-
riro Volcanic Centre)) are typically characterised by a suc-
cession of small to moderate sized eruptions occurring, on
average, every 50 to 300 years from approximately the
same vent area over a long period of time. Activity at cal-
dera volcanoes, on the other hand (i.e. Taupo, Okataina
and Mayor Island), is characterised by far less frequent
(on average every 1000–2000 years), moderate to ex-
ceptionally large sized eruptions. These eruptions are
capable of generating large volumes of material that
can be distributed over exceptionally large areas many
hundreds of kilometres downwind. The impact of a dis-
tant eruption will be uniformly widespread across the
entire Auckland Region (Johnston et al. 1997a) and
contrasts with the relatively localised impact of hazardsgenerated from an eruption within the Auckland Vol-
canic Field (Johnston et al. 1997b).
A.E.L.P. methodology overview
The general methodology used for the A.E.L.P. can be
broken up into a number of tasks as shown in the flow
chart in Figure 3. Definitions of terms used in Figure 3
(and throughout the text) are shown in Table 1. The focus
of the A.E.L.P. was on utility impact and utility response
to make the project manageable. Second order impacts in-
cluding those on the wider community were to be consid-
ered as part of Stage 2 (Figure 3). At the time of writing
(mid-2014), Stage 2 was almost complete.
Task 3 in Figure 3 identified the vulnerabilities or
sensitivities of each utility’s distribution networks and
critical facilities (‘networks’ and ‘nodes’) to damage
using the information from Tasks 1 and 2. Work under-
taken in Task 2 produced an important advancement in
the ability to move from hazard to damage through the
translation of descriptive (qualitative) hazard impacts
into a form that the utilities could use to assess impacts
to specific infrastructural components (e.g. pipes, elec-
tricity sub-stations, water pumping stations, roads etc.).
Being able to assess impacts in this way provided a first
step towards an assessment of risk which would be ex-
panded upon in subsequent work (e.g. DEVORA, 2014).
The Task 3 analysis was split into:
i. A uniform hazard analysis, which analysed the
vulnerability of each individual utility to the
hazards based on known information, and
ii. A scenario hazard event, which analysed the
vulnerability of all utilities to a clearly defined
hypothetical event exemplifying the most likely
worst case for each hazard.
The uniform hazard analysis examined information
known about each hazard across the entire region in
order to highlight to each utility specific areas where its
networks and nodes might be vulnerable to the impacts
of a hazard event wherever the event occurred.
The focus of the scenario events was not to identify the
vulnerability of specific strategic assets but rather to look
at the response of the network system as a whole and
show the interdependencies between individual utilities by
using a particular eruption scenario as an example.
Utilities were asked to step through a vulnerability as-
sessment (Tasks 3 and 4 in Figure 3) for each of the uni-
form and scenario hazards provided, with the assistance of
flow charts and matrices describing damage probability
and type (Figures 4, 5, 6 and Tables 2 and 3).
Utilities were then asked to identify their likely re-
sponse to the event (Task 9 in Figure 3) and their abil-
ity to recover (repair identified network and node
Figure 1 Map of the Auckland Volcanic Field. (source: Lindsay et al. 2011).
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each utility was developed which when combined with
other recovery profiles allowed for an analysis of the
utility system impact (Task 6 in Figure 3).
Finally, utilities were asked as part of Task 3 (Figure 3)
to develop a prioritised mitigation list with helpfrom matrices specifically developed for this purpose
(Table 4).
The A.E.L.P. methodology used hazard and infrastruc-
ture maps developed in ARC GIS (ARC Geographical
Information Systems). Damage probability and damage
type matrices were developed by the project team, and
Figure 2 Map showing the North Island of New Zealand, the location of the Auckland region (blue), and the volcanic centres identified
as posing a risk to the region. (source: Magill 2002).
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were conducted in workshop settings. While much of
the analysis could have been automated, the educational
value of the discussions was enormous and resulted in
much higher levels of buy-in to the eventual mitigation
work that was recommended in the concluding stages of
the project and which formed the basis for subsequent
work undertaken by the lifeline utilities as part of the
Auckland Lifelines Group.
Volcanic hazard analysis
The volcanic hazard analysis looked at the effects of an
eruption in the Auckland Volcanic Field (Figure 1) as well
as an eruption elsewhere in the North Island (Figure 2), as
distal eruptions have the potential to deposit ash in such
volumes as to have a major disruptive impact on the re-
gion’s utility services and wider community.
For the Auckland Volcanic Field, the assessment is
complicated by the fact that the next eruption could
occur anywhere within a 360 km2 area. A zone ofuniform hazard was identified which comprised the
known extent of the volcanic field. The focus of the
uniform hazard was to identify the vulnerability of
each utility’s service network and nodes to an event,
which could occur anywhere within the Auckland
Volcanic Field.
Three scenarios events were used in the project. One
local scenario from the Auckland Volcanic Field centred in
the waterfront of the central business district (CBD) and
two distant eruptions from Mt Taranaki and the Okataina
Volcanic Centre (Figure 2) (based on scenarios developed
by Johnston et al. 1997a and 1997b). The local scenario
event has an average return period of 1:1,000 years, based
on the last 20 such events occurring over a 20,000 year
period. Return periods for Mt Taranaki and Okataina were
taken as 1:300 and 1:2,000 years respectively (Johnston
et al.1997a and 1997b).
The CBD location was selected for the local event be-
cause it encompassed both phreatomagmatic (explosive)
and magmatic (effusive) eruption styles and because it
Figure 3 Flow chart of the A.E.L.P. methodology. (source: Daly and Wilkie 1999).
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vices as well as residential areas (Figure 7).
The eruption style and magnitude of the eruption sce-
nario was based on a Mt. Wellington (Figure 1) sized
eruption in terms of the volume of material erupted. ForTable 1 Definition of terms used in the Auckland Engineering
Wilkie 1999)
Term Definition
Damage Physical harm impairing the operation of a system, net
Event The hypothetical occurrence of any of the natural disa
place during a particular time interval (Australian/New
Hazard The future occurrence or risk of occurrence of any of t
situation with a potential to cause loss.
Impact The time - related effect of damage, comprising:
Node impact - the reduction in operational performan
Network impact - the time and spatial reduction in fun
System impact - the reduction in function of the comb
Regional impact - The cumulative effect of the system
Regional system The integrated and interrelated social, commercial, cul
Scenario analysis Defining a particular scenario to enable the impact of
Uniform hazard
analysis
Defining a given hazard enables mitigation measures f
Utility network An interconnected set of utility components and links
Utility node A discrete constituent of the utility network.
Utility system The combined utility networks, their interdependencie
Vulnerability The extent to which a system, network or node is sensthe purposes of the A.E.L.P, this size eruption was as-
sumed to totally destroy above ground services within a
3 km radius of the vent (blast zone). Below ground ser-
vices were assumed to be affected within a 1 km radius
of the vent. In order to ensure full service redundancy, aLifelines Project 1996–1999 (modified after Daly and
work or node caused by an event.
sters considered. An incident or situation which occurs in a particular
Zealand Risk Management Standard 4360:1999).
he natural disasters considered. The source of potential harm or a
ce and function of a damaged node.
ction of the utility network caused by the cumulative node impacts.
ined network impact on the whole utility system.
impact and other non-utility effects on the region.
tural, political, legal and natural environment of the region.
a specific event on the entire utility system to be assessed.
or each utility to be rapidly identified.
for providing a utility service.
s and the interrelations for providing infrastructure services.
itive to damage from an event.
Figure 4 Flow chart for damage assessment of nodes and networks due to uniform volcanic hazard. (source: Daly and Wilkie 1999).
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ground) would be needed between the utility elements.
The lifeline utilities examined their own vulnerabilities
on this basis. However, because the main effects of the
distant eruptions were from ash fall, most of the vulner-
ability assessments focused on the effects of ash fall ra-
ther than complete localised destruction of part of the
utility network.
The above ground damage zone of 3 km radius was
subsequently adopted by the Auckland Regional Councilin their volcanic contingency plan. The Council added a
further 2 km margin of safety to create a 5 km radius for
evacuation purposes (Auckland Regional Council, 2002).
At the time of writing, the renamed 3 km ‘extreme risk
zone’ and the additional 2 km ‘high risk zone’ remain as
the starting point for evacuation planning purposes
(Auckland Council, 2013).
The two distant eruption scenarios focussed on ash as
the primary hazard. The first deposited 1 mm of vol-
canic ash over the region from a 0.1 km3 andesitic
Figure 5 Flow chart for damage assessment of nodes and networks due to local volcanic hazard scenario. (source: Daly and Wilkie 1999).
Note that references to Tables C, D and E in this flow chart are Tables 2, 3 and 4 in this paper respectively.
Daly and Johnston Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:7 Page 7 of 17eruption of Taranaki (Figure 2) and the second deposited
100 mm of volcanic ash from a 4 km3 rhyolite eruption
from the Okataina Volcanic Centre (Figure 2).
Damage and mitigation assessment methodology
Two matrices were developed and provided a qualitative
assessment of the type and likelihood of damage (Ta-
bles 2 and 3) from ash fall to a range of infrastructure
within the Auckland region. These matrices are based
on observed impacts of past volcanic eruptions (e.g.
Blong 1984, Johnston 1997a). A third matrix provided
options for mitigating the effects of ash fall (Table 4). As
mentioned above, these matrices produced an important
advancement in the ability to move from hazard to vol-
canic risk through the translation of descriptive (qualita-
tive) hazard impacts into a form that the utilities could
use to assess impacts to specific infrastructural compo-
nents (e.g. pipes, electricity sub-stations, water pumping
stations, roads etc.). This early work has led to and in-
formed the subsequent development of semi-quantitative
descriptions of damage (e.g. Wilson et al. 2009), posters
for utilities on how to manage volcanic ash (Wilson et al.2014b) and fragility functions for different infrastructural
components to volcanic ash (e.g. Wardman et al., 2012;
Wilson et al., 2012; Wilson et al. 2014a).
Damage assessment of nodes and networks due to
uniform volcanic activity
A zone of uniform hazard was identified which comprised
the known extent of the volcanic field (Figure 8). Within
this zone, an eruption was assumed to cause 100% damage
to over-ground services within a 3 km radius (blast zone)
and to underground services within a radius of 1 km. Out-
side these distances, the principal damage results from
ash. The analysis damage to nodes and networks due to
uniform volcanic activity was undertaken following the
flow chart in Figure 4. The uniform hazard analysis is es-
sentially a rapid once over of all critical network facilities
which ranks them as having negligible, moderate, or high
probability of damage based on their overall damage as-
sessment. This enabled a prioritised list of mitigation mea-
sures to be developed which was able to be incorporated
directly into utilities’ own strategic asset management and
maintenance programmes.
Figure 6 Flow chart for damage assessment of nodes and
networks due to distant volcanic hazard scenarios. (source: Daly
and Wilkie 1999). Note that references to Tables C, D and E in this flow
chart are Tables 2, 4 and 3 in this paper respectively. Worksheets 6C
and 6D referred to have not been reproduced in this paper, but can be
found in the original documentation (Daly and Wilkie 1999). An
example of a worksheet for a related task can be found in Figure 9.
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scenario volcanic eruptions
The analysis of damage to nodes and networks due to the
local scenario eruption was undertaken following the flow-
chart in Figure 5, on worksheets as shown in Figure 9.
Similarly, the analysis of damage to nodes and networks
due to the different ash thicknesses from the two distal
eruption scenarios was undertaken following the flowchart
in Figure 6, on worksheets similar to that shown in
Figure 9.
Through consideration of the likely damage from a par-
ticular scenario a picture can be developed of the effects
of an event on the entire system and forms a resource for
use when developing strategies for response and recovery.
Interdependence is addressed through reconciling theimpacts of various services from the same event with
performance post event.
Recovery profile (interdependencies)
The concept of a Recovery Profile was developed to de-
scribe how a hazard event would affect a utility’s ability
to function at different stages after a scenario event by
asking:
a) What percentage of service was available
immediately after the event?
b) What percentage of service was available one week
after the event?
c) How many days, weeks or months would be
required to get back to full service, including any
temporary fixes?
Lifelines were asked to develop a recovery profile per
significant network node or element (Figure 9) and ul-
timately to form a view of the overall recovery profile of
their network as a result.
An iterative process was used, initially assuming unlim-
ited resources and unrestricted access to sites for repairs.
The recovery profiles of all lifelines were discussed in a
workshop setting and reviewed. Individual utilities then
reassessed their profiles on the basis of a more realistic as-
sessment of access, competition for resources and inter-
dependency of services. Subsequent discussions with other
lifelines utilities typically, and as expected, had the effect
of making recovery profiles longer.
The methodology initially proposed to map the recov-
ery profiles to show impacted zones, i.e. areas where ser-
vice was unavailable one day and one week after the
event, and where full recovery took a long time. In prac-
tice this proved impractical within the timeframe due to
the collation of large volume of data from the recovery
profiles that this exercise required. As a result, the exer-
cise was amended to focus on areas or elements of sig-
nificant service loss in each utility and how that affected
the rest of that network.
A workshop was held at the conclusion of the vulner-
ability assessment to allow each lifeline utility to:
a) Outline its network’s capabilities for servicing the
other utilities,
b) Hold individual discussions with each of the other
lifeline sectors to identify and understand each
other’s interdependencies.
A matrix for the scenario eruption (Figure 10) was devel-
oped which demonstrated the interdependencies and the
priority which each lifeline had on the others for operation
and recovery. As network systems are often complex, no
particular precision can be claimed in the numbers given,
Table 2 Volcanic ash-induced damage to structures matrix (modified after Daly and Wilkie, 1999)
Structure Ash thickness <1 mm Ash thickness 1-5 mm Ash thickness 5 - 100 mm Ash thickness >100 mm
Pipework
Open systems (ie stormwater) Low probability High probability High probability High probability
Closed systems Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
Building structures
Flat-roof Low probability Mod. probability High probability High probability
Pitched-roofs (>20°) Low probability Mod. probability High probability High probability
Building services
Air-conditioning Low probability Mod. probability High probability High probability
Gutters Low probability Mod. probability High probability High probability
Electricity services
Power lines Negligible Low probability Mod. probability High probability
Power line insulators:
Low voltage Negligible Mod. probability High probability High probability
High voltage Negligible Low probability Mod. probability High probability
Substations Negligible Mod. probability High probability High probability
Civil structures
Roads Low probability High probability High probability High probability
Rail Negligible Mod. probability High probability High probability
Wastewater
Sewage pumps Low probability High probability High probability High probability
Sewage treatment plant Low probability Mod. probability High probability High probability
Water Supply Systems
River/Stream Low probability High probability High probability High probability
Uncovered reservoir Low probability Mod. probability High probability High probability
Cover reservoir/ground water Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
Roof-fed tank Low probability High probability High probability High probability
Telecommunications
Lines Negligible Low probability Mod. probability High probability
Microwave towers Low probability Mod. probability Mod. probability High probability
Exchange equipment:
External air-conditioning Low probability High probability High probability High probability
Internal Air-conditioning Negligible Low probability Low probability Low probability
Specific infrastructure
Ports Low probability High probability High probability High probability
Airports: Air transport Mod. probability High probability High probability High probability
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period following an eruption affecting Auckland. The
process showed that road (access), cellular communication,
and fuel, were lifelines on which others were hugely reliant.
A close fourth was electricity. Note that water supply was
ranked quite low in the analysis. This was because the pro-
ject focussed on the physical recovery needs of the lifelines
themselves rather than on the immediate needs of staff or
the community.Results and discussion
Analysis of the worksheets, workshop discussion sum-
maries, and Figure 10 confirms many of the conclusions
reached in other studies (e.g. Johnston 1997a):
a) Specific items of equipment identified as critical
to a network’s operation and which are also highly
vulnerable to volcanic ash, should be protected
(if possible) against ash fall.
Table 3 Volcanic ash-induced damage type matrix (source: Daly and Wilkie, 1999)





water (or sewage turbidity)
Blockage depending on
water (or sewage turbidity)
Blockage depending on
water (or sewage turbidity)
Blockage depending on water
(or sewage turbidity)
Closed systems N/A N/A N/A N/A
Building structures
Flat-roof Corrosion damage on metal
roofs, especially if freshly
painted
Corrosion damage on
metal roofs, especially if
freshly painted
Corrosion damage on
metal roofs, especially if
freshly painted
Corrosion damage to metal roofs;
loading damage potential for flat
roofed structures, moderate if dry
(high over 300 mm), high if wet.
Pitched-roofs (>20°) Corrosion damage on metal
roofs, especially if freshly
painted
Corrosion damage on
metal roofs, especially if
freshly painted
Corrosion damage on
metal roofs, especially if
freshly painted
Corrosion damage to metal roofs,
low to moderate risk of load damage
depending on roof pitch.
Building services






Blockage, abrasion damage to
moving parts.




Blockage from reworked ash, load
damage.
Electricity Services




Loading, tree breakages onto lines
Power line insulators N/A Short-circuiting (flashover),
low potential if ash is dry,
high if ash is wet.
Short-circuiting (flashover),
low potential if ash is dry,
high if ash is wet.
Short-circuiting (flashover), low
potential if ash is dry, high if ash
is wet.
Substations N/A Short-circuiting (flashover),
low potential if ash is dry,
high if ash is wet. Abrasion
damage to moving parts.
Short-circuiting (flashover),
low potential if ash is dry,
high if ash is wet. Abrasion
damage to moving parts.
Short-circuiting (flashover), low
potential if ash is dry, high if ash is
wet. Abrasion damage to moving
parts.
Civil Structures




Blockage, reduced traction and
visibility
Rail N/A Reduced traction and
visibility, short-circuiting of




electric signals if ash is wet.
Blockage, reduced traction and
visibility, short-circuiting of electric
signals if ash is wet.
Wastewater
Sewage pumps Abrasion damage to moving
parts (depends on turbidity
of sewage)
Abrasion damage to
moving parts (depends on
turbidity of sewage)
Abrasion damage to
moving parts (depends on
turbidity of sewage)
Abrasion damage to moving parts
(depends on turbidity of sewage)
Sewage treatment
plant
Abrasion damage to moving
parts (depends on turbidity
of sewage)
Abrasion damage to
moving parts (depends on
turbidity of sewage),
damage to pond oxidation
process.
Abrasion damage to
moving parts (depends on
turbidity of sewage),
damage to pond oxidation
process.
Abrasion damage to moving parts
(depends on turbidity of sewage),
damage to pond oxidation process.
Water Supply Systems






pH and turbidity contamination




pH and turbidity contamination
Cover reservoir/
ground water
N/A N/A N/A N/A
Roof-fed tank Chemical, pH and turbidity
contamination
Chemical, pH and turbidity
contamination
Chemical, pH and turbidity
contamination
Chemical, pH and turbidity
contamination
Telecommunications
Lines N/A Loading, tree breakage onto lines
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Microwave towers N/A Corrosion of metal
surfaces.








damage to moving parts
Short-circuiting (flashover)
of equipment, abrasion
damage to moving parts
Short-circuiting (flashover)
of equipment, abrasion






N/A N/A N/A N/A
Specific infrastructure
Ports Potential corrosion and
abrasion damage to port
facilities
Potential corrosion and
abrasion damage to port
facilities
Potential corrosion and
abrasion damage to port
facilities
Potential corrosion and abrasion


















Potential corrosion and abrasion
damage to aircraft and airport
(communications) installations,
loading damage potential for flat
roofed structures, moderate if dry
(high over 300 mm), high if wet.
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relation to other 'lifelines' and in terms of public
use. Access to utilities to remove ash and/or protect
them often requires the use of roads at the very
time they are affected by ash falls. Despite their
importance they have a low dependence on other
'lifelines'.
c) Fuel supplies are important for standby electricity
generation, and road, rail and air transportation,
but most utilities will have access to sufficient
supplies after an ash fall. Supplies have a moderate
to low dependence on other 'lifelines'.
d) Electricity supplies are important for the operation of
many 'lifelines' and are vulnerable during and after ash
falls. Back-up electricity may not necessarily be avail-
able after an ash fall. Electricity supplies have only
a moderate dependence on other 'lifelines'.
e) Cellular communications have a high priority during
the initial recovery period.
f ) Telephone systems have a moderate importance to
other 'lifelines' but are highly dependent on electricity
supplies and air-conditioning.
g) Air-conditioning units are important to a few
lifelines, notably telephones, and are dependent
on electricity and water.
h) Water supplies are required by a few 'lifelines' but
since supply systems are relatively robust in Auckland,
short-term problems should be minimal. However,
water supplies have a high dependence on other
'lifelines', notably electricity supplies. Increased
demand may strain the system.i) Stormwater, sewerage, rail, gas supplies and air
transport are not required by most 'lifelines' but
are highly dependent on others.
The interdependence table (Figure 10) is limited in that
it does not indicate the consequence of the failure of cer-
tain lifelines to society in general. Sewerage and storm
water both have low priority factors but are highly vulner-
able to ash falls and their failure will have major societal
impacts. Buildings, whether they are residential, business,
or critical facilities (hospitals, fire and police stations, civil
defence facilities, schools etc.), are extremely vulnerable to
disruptions of lifelines which provide the services that
allow them to operate. Electricity is required for lighting,
ventilation, boilers, water heating, refrigerators/freezers,
kitchens, medical services, lifts and security. Water supply
is required for the satisfactory operation of hot and cold
water systems, fire hoses and sprinklers, kitchens and la-
boratories. Communication facilities are critical for the
operation of emergency management organisations, and
usually require continued electricity supply.
An assessment of the vulnerability of lifelines must
therefore consider the physical vulnerability of the particu-
lar lifeline, its dependence on other lifelines, the flow-on
effects that its disruption may have and the societal de-
mands placed on that lifeline after an event. Failure to
consider all these aspects is illustrated by major water
shortages in Anchorage, Alaska following a light ash fall
from the 1992 Mount Spurr eruption. A vulnerability as-
sessment of the water supply system and subsequent con-
tingency planning had failed to anticipate increased water
Table 4 Volcanic ash-induced mitigation matrix (source: Daly and Wilkie, 1999)




Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Monitor turbidity levels, where possible
limit ash entering systems
Monitor turbidity levels, where possible limit
ash entering systems, remove ash from pipes.
Closed systems N/A N/A N/A
Building structures Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Close windows, doors and other openings Initiate ash removal procedures immediately,
prioritize efforts
Building services
Air-conditioning Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Shut down and cover air-intakes, if still in
use monitor filters and clean or replace
when necessary
Initiate ash removal procedures immediately,
prioritize efforts
Gutters Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
N/A Remove ash to prevent loading damage
Electricity services Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Power lines Cut back tree branches from above
lines




Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Monitor the situation carefully Initiate ash removal procedures immediately,
prioritize efforts
Civil structures
Roads and rail Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Monitor the situation carefully, limit
vehicle use
Initiate ash removal procedures immediately,
prioritize efforts, enhance vehicle
maintenance.
Wastewater Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Warn public against disposing of ash
in the stormwater system
Warn public of disposing of ash in the
stormwater system.
Sewage pumps Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Monitor turbidity levels in the sewage and
shut down if levels are high
Monitor turbidity levels in the sewage and
shut down if levels are high.
Sewage treatment plant Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Monitor turbidity levels in the sewage and
shut down if levels are high
Monitor turbidity levels in the sewage and
shut down if levels are high.
Water supply systems Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Cover reservoir ventilators, disconnect roof
fed supplies, monitor water quality
Initiate water supply management
procedures, monitor water quality
Telecommunications Increase awareness of potential




Fit internal air-conditioning units Seal exchanges where possible, shut down if
required, monitor the situation carefully




N/A Monitor the situation carefully Initiate ash removal procedures immediately,
prioritize efforts
Specific infrastructure
Ports Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Shut down vulnerability equipment, monitor
the situation carefully
Initiate ash removal procedures immediately,
prioritize efforts
Airports - Air transport Increase awareness of potential
problems, develop contingency plans
Close airspace, shut down airports Initiate ash removal procedures immediately,
prioritize efforts
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Figure 7 Scenario hazard map for an event in Auckland’s central business district (source: Daly and Wilkie 1999).
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Figure 8 Uniform hazard map of the Auckland Volcanic Field. (source: Daly and Wilkie 1999).
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Figure 9 Example of a worksheet used to guide utilities through the damage, impact and recovery assessment process. Worksheets
were filled in for node and network elements (separately) for each of the three scenario events (one local eruption and two distal eruptions – refer text
for more information). (source: Daly and Wilkie 1999).
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sures were not taken once an ash fall warning was re-
ceived (Johnston 1997b).Conclusions
As well as identifying vulnerable elements and mitiga-
tion measures for individual utilities, the A.E.L.P. meth-
odology allowed the effect on the entire network system
to be assessed by considering a specific eruption sce-
nario (among other hazards). The assessment focused
on damage and the expected time taken to restore a cer-
tain level of service. This information formed the foun-
dation of a regional response by lifeline utilities to such
an event, and can be further developed to include essen-
tial non-utility services such as hospitals and emergency
service centres.The methodology used a mix of workshops and individ-
ual lifeline analyses to collect the information required. It
was time consuming and may have been able to have been
automated. However, the increase understanding about
the network as a system gained through a more interactive
process cannot be understated. Similarly, the relationships
built up between the lifeline utility organisations enabled
more robust and coordinated response planning arrange-
ments to be put in place.
The A.E.L.P. methodology and supporting information
was developed specifically for the lifeline utility sector, but
in doing so provided the impetus for a refocused effort in
understanding Auckland’s volcanic risk. The eruption sce-
nario descriptions, lifeline utility network information,
damage and mitigation tables have remained in current
use up until relatively recently when new studies under-
way are updating the information (e.g. AELP-2, 2014,


























































Electricity 3 5 4 5 5 5 1 1 5 2 2 2
Gas 1 5 4 5 5 1 1 1 5 2 2 2
Fuel 5 1 4 5 5 2 1 1 5 2 2 2
Land Comms 4 1 5 3 0 4 0 2 4 0 1 4








Broadcasting 4 0 5 4 3 2 0 1 4 0 1 4
Water 5 1 4 3 5 5 1 1 5 2 1 1
Sewage 5 1 3 3 5 4 3 1 5 1 1 1
Stormwater 2 1 1 3 5 5 4 1 5 1 1 1
Road 2 1 5 4 5 5 4 1 5 1 3 3
Rail 4 1 5 4 5 5 3 1 5 5 2 1
Ports 4 1 5 4 5 2 2 1 4 5 2 1
Airport 4 1 5 4 5 5 5 1 2 5 1 2
Total 44 12 53 45 56 48 36 9 26 57 14 19 26
High Priority lifelines for recovery
Interdependence to be assessed against each lifeline item on a 
scale from 0 - 5 (nil - high requirement for recovery)
Figure 10 Interdependence recovery matrix for Auckland’s lifeline utilities after the scenario eruption. (source: Daly and Wilkie 1999).
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the basis of evacuation planning for the region (Auckland
Regional Council 2002) and the damage tables became the
foundation for more quantitative fragility function re-
search (e.g. Wilson et al., 2009; Wardman et al., 2012;
Wilson et al., 2012; Wilson et al. 2014a) and informa-
tion for lifelines on how to manage ash before, during
and after ash fall (Wilson et al. 2014b).
The benefit to the many lifelines of participation in the A.
E.L.P led to the establishment in 2000 of the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group (A.E.L.G.) (renamed the
Auckland Lifelines Group 2014) which is continuing
work to reduce the vulnerability of Auckland’s lifeline
utility network to various natural hazard events.
The approach taken to develop the damage levels and
time taken to restore levels of service after a large event
may be useful for other cities around the world as in-
creased emphasis is placed on reducing the vulnerability
of their cities’ infrastructure.
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